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Global Challenges
Issue no. 18 | December 2025
Genocide and International Law: The Power of Semantics
Genocide and International Law | Article 5

Never Again? Rwanda and the Paradox of the Law

Reading time: 4 min
The “genocide against the Tutsi” continues to form a central part of Rwanda’s contemporary identity, and denial of the genocide is now a criminal offence. At the same time, the power of the genocidal narrative and its exclusive focus on the historical crimes against the Tutsi may encourage a selective amnesia, as dissent is silenced and potential crimes against Hutus go unpunished.

During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the horrific slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi carried out in plain sight of the global community and its institutions forced a reckoning with the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention. Out of this arguably preventable tragedy rose the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), a landmark experiment that later fed into the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Yet, Rwanda’s story since 1994 effectively complicates these outcomes, with the law serving as a national conscience of sorts, albeit one that is repeatedly subject to political exploitation.

From Guardian to Accused

The ICTR was the first tribunal to define rape as a weapon of genocide, and it expanded the understanding of crimes against humanity. At the same time, its distance from Rwandan society, its tribunal in Arusha and appeals court in The Hague, created resentment. The tribunal prosecuted génocidaires, while atrocities attributed to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) — the force that ended the genocide and assumed power — largely evaded prosecution. Many survivors saw justice, but just as many saw selectivity.

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Gacaca court in Rwamagana district by Elisa Finocchiaro / CC BY-NC 2.0.

Inside Rwanda, the RPF built its legitimacy by means of commemoration and control. The gacaca courts, Rwanda’s experiment with community justice, processed more than a million cases. They brought a sense of accountability but they, too, reproduced asymmetry: Hutu suspects were punished, while alleged RPF crimes remained unprosecuted. The official phrase “genocide against the Tutsi” became the central pillar of national identity, legally codified with the 2008 “genocide ideology” law criminalising denial in terms that allowed it to be used against critics. Opposition leader Victoire Ingabire was jailed after calling for the recognition of Hutu victims; journalists faced exile or harassment; dissidents abroad, like former spy chief Patrick Karegeya, were killed in suspicious circumstances.

Beyond its borders, Rwanda invested heavily in crafting the image of a responsible international actor. Its troops served in United Nations and African Union peacekeeping missions from Darfur to Mozambique. Yet, Rwanda’s reputation was further unsettled by reports from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that described killings of Hutu refugees and abuses by Rwandan-backed militias — what some suggest amount to crimes against humanity or even genocide. The contradiction is stark: a state born from genocide, elevated as a champion of “Never Again”, simultaneously faces accusations of grave violations. The contradiction is stark: a state born from genocide, elevated as a champion of “Never Again”, simultaneously faces accusations of grave violations. International admiration for Rwanda’s post-genocide recovery has arguably muted criticism of these contradictions.

A Distorted Image of Itself

The term “genocide” has unparalleled force, legally and politically. Kigali insists on the precise formulation “genocide against the Tutsi” to preserve historical clarity and block narratives that equate different kinds of violence, an insistence that further restricts and narrows. In Rwanda’s case, the vocabulary itself has become part of governance, used simultaneously to preserve and dismantle.

Do international treaties — designed to protect civilians, prevent genocide and regulate the use of war — then continue to carry any weight? The broader system of international justice, once galvanised by Rwanda’s tragedy, is now faced with growing disillusionment. The ICTR’s one-sided record alienated many Rwandans. The ICC, hailed as universal, is criticised for its selectivity, raising concerns of a great-power bias. Rwanda, not a state party to the Rome Statute, never fully cooperated with it, all the more so after it indicted Rwandan-backed commanders of DRC militias. And while the International Court of Justice (ICJ) continues to issue important rulings, it is faced with geopolitical paralysis. As confidence wanes, atrocities multiply.

Until 1994, Rwanda and Burundi resembled mirror images of each other: while Tutsi elites dominated politics in Burundi, Hutu elites held sway in Rwanda. Burundi’s minority regime systematically targeted the country’s Hutu community, whereas the reverse held sway in majority dominated Rwanda. Since 1994, Rwanda’s own reflection has come to be distorted. The regime, forged in the aftermath of genocide, reveals how laws against genocidal ideologies can be used to enforce official memory and silence dissent, to foster accountability and enable domination. The lesson from Rwanda is therefore paradoxical: the law, far from being irrelevant, is vulnerable.

Electronic reference

Bhavnani, Ravi. “Never Again? Rwanda and the Paradox of the Law.” Global Challenges, no. 18, December 2025. URL: https://globalchallenges.ch/issue/18/never-again-rwanda-and-the-paradox-of-the-law.

Dossier produced by the Geneva Graduate Institute’s Research Office.

Header image caption: RWANDA - CIRCA 1990: A stamp printed in Rwanda dedicated to fight against genocide.

BOX | Genocides: UN Recognition and Historical Consensus

Genocides officially recognised by the UN
  • The Holocaust (Shoah) (1941–1945), recognised via UN General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) in 1946, which led to the 1948 Genocide Convention
  • Genocide against the Tutsi (Rwanda, 1994), recognised by UN Security Council Resolutions 955 and 978 (1994); International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established
  • Srebrenica Genocide (Bosnia, 1995), recognised by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (2007 ruling)
Genocides recognised by other international or national bodies
  • Herero and Nama Genocide (German Southwest Africa, 1904–1908), recognised by Germany (2021)
  • Assyrian and Pontic Greek Genocides (1914–1923), recognised by some national parliaments
  • Armenian Genocide (1915–1917), recognised by many national parliaments (France, Germany, Canada, etc.)
  • Holodomor (Ukraine famine) (1932–1933), recognised by Ukraine and several countries
  • Cambodian Genocide (1975–1979), recognised by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
  • Anfal Campaign against Kurds (Iraq, 1988),  recognised by several national courts
  • Darfur Genocide (Sudan, 2003–present), prosecuted by the International Criminal Court; UN uses “crimes against humanity”
Genocides not officially recognised but widely documented by historians
  • Destruction of Indigenous Peoples of the Americas (16th–20th centuries), considered genocidal by many historians
  • Cultural genocide of Indigenous Peoples (Canada, Australia, etc.), recognised as “cultural genocide” or “systemic assimilation”, not as genocide in the UN’s legal sense
  • Massacre of the Aché People (Paraguay, 1960s–1970s), documented by NGOs and historians
Currently under UN investigation (status pending)
  • Gaza / Occupied Palestinian Territories, UN experts describe acts as “genocidal”
  • Rohingya in Myanmar, UN Independent Investigative Mechanism; case before the International Court of Justice
  • Tigray (Ethiopia), joint UN–Ethiopian Human Rights Commission investigations
  • Ukraine, UN Commission of Inquiry examining possible incitement to genocide
  • Uyghurs in China (Xinjiang), ongoing UN human rights investigations

United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 96 (I), “The Crime of Genocide”, 11 December 1946, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/209873.

United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/60/7, “Holocaust Remembrance”, 21 November 2005, https://docs.un.org/a/res/60/7.

United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/78/282, “International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica”, 23 May 2024, https://docs.un.org/A/Res/78/282.

United Nations, “UN Resolutions Relevant to Genocide Prevention”, https://www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/SA-prevention-genocide/UN-resolutions.

United Nations, “UN General Assembly Adopts Resolution on Srebrenica Genocide, Designating International Day of Reflection, Commemoration”, press release, 23 May 2024, https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12601.doc.htm.

Info Box

BOX | Official Definition of the Genocide in the UN Genocide Convention

The concept of genocide was defined legally for the first time in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948. According to Article II of this convention, genocide means “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:

a) Killing members of the group;

b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

To be noted: “measures to prevent births”, such as forced sterilisation, can therefore be legally considered an act constituting genocide — provided that the deliberate intention to destroy a targeted group can be proven. It is this dimension of genocidal intent that makes it difficult to legally recognise forced sterilisation as genocide, even if it technically meets the criteria defined by the Convention

United Nations, https://www.un.org/

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Info Box

BOX | Genocides: UN Recognition and Historial Consensus

Genocides officially recognised by the UN

  • The Holocaust (Shoah)(1941–1945), recognised via UN General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) in 1946, which led to the 1948 Genocide Convention
  • Genocide against the Tutsi(Rwanda, 1994), recognised by UN Security Council Resolutions 955 and 978 (1994); International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established
  • Srebrenica Genocide(Bosnia, 1995), recognised by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (2007 ruling)

Genocides recognised by other international or national bodies

  • Herero and Nama Genocide (German Southwest Africa, 1904–1908), recognised by Germany (2021)
  • Assyrian and Pontic Greek Genocides (1914–1923), recognised by some national parliaments
  • Armenian Genocide (1915–1917), recognised by many national parliaments (France, Germany, Canada, etc.)
  • Holodomor (Ukraine famine) (1932–1933), recognised by Ukraine and several countries
  • Cambodian Genocide (1975–1979), recognised by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
  • Anfal Campaign against Kurds (Iraq, 1988), recognised by several national courts
  • Darfur Genocide(Sudan, 2003–present), prosecuted by the International Criminal Court; UN uses “crimes against humanity”

Genocides not officially recognised but widely documented by historians

  • Destruction of Indigenous Peoples of the Americas (16th–20th centuries), considered genocidal by many historians
  • Cultural genocide of Indigenous Peoples (Canada, Australia, etc.), recognised as “cultural genocide” or “systemic assimilation”, not as genocide in the UN’s legal sense
  • Massacre of the Aché People (Paraguay, 1960s–1970s), documented by NGOs and historians

Currently under UN investigation (status pending)

  • Gaza / Occupied Palestinian Territories, acts described by UN experts as “genocidal”
  • Rohingya in Myanmar, UN Independent Investigative Mechanism; case before the International Court of Justice
  • Tigray (Ethiopia), joint UN–Ethiopian Human Rights Commission investigations
  • Ukraine, UN Commission of Inquiry examining possible incitement to genocide
  • Uyghurs in China (Xinjiang), ongoing UN human rights investigations

Source: Marc Galvin, Wikipedia, ChapGPT, CoPilot, UN.

Info Box

BOX | Complaint for Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

Genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are among the most serious international crimes, as defined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the Geneva Conventions (1949) and their Protocols, and the Rome Statute (1998), which established the International Criminal Court (ICC). They are considered non-prescriptible: complaints can be filed even decades later.

Where can complaints be filed?

– Before the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is the main international court

The ICC can try cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression. Cases can be referred to it in three ways: by a State Party to the Rome Statute (123 States today), by the ICC Prosecutor, who can take up a case on his own initiative after authorisation by the judges, or by the UN Security Council (even for non-member States, e.g. Darfur, Libya).

Can an individual file a complaint? Yes, but in the form of a communication to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). The ICC is not a direct complaint jurisdiction like a national court: an individual can submit a case, but only the Prosecutor decides whether to open an investigation.

There are significant limitations to the ICC. It only tries individuals, not states. It only has jurisdiction if the crime took place on the territory of a state party, if the perpetrator is a national of a state party, or if the Security Council refers the case. Finally, some geopolitically important States do not recognise the ICC (the United States, Russia, China, Israel, etc.).

– Before a national court

Many States now allow complaints for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, even if the crimes were committed abroad and by foreigners. This is known as universal jurisdiction. Examples of countries that regularly use it include France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada (partially) and Spain (more limited since 2014). The specific conditions vary from country to country, but generally require the presence of the suspect on the territory (often required), a complaint from victims or NGOs, and national prosecutors who open investigations themselves. This mechanism is increasingly active (trials of Syrian torturers, Rwandan soldiers, etc.).

– Before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The ICJ does not judge individuals, but can be called upon in disputes between States, particularly for accusations of genocide (e.g. Gambia v. Myanmar; South Africa v. Israel), violations of the Geneva Conventions via State responsibility, and disputes over the interpretation of international treaties. It is important to note that private individuals cannot bring cases before the ICJ. Only states can do so.

The courts for Rwanda and Kosovo

Complaints cannot be brought before these courts. They are ad hoc international criminal tribunals with jurisdiction to try individuals responsible for serious crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes).

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in 1994 by the UN Security Council to try those responsible for the genocide of the Tutsis and crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda.

The Special Tribunal for Kosovo (Kosovo Chambers) was established in 2015, based in The Hague, to try crimes committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) between 1998 and 2000.

There may be indirect interactions with the ICJ, for example when the ICJ examines the responsibility of a State for acts that also constitute crimes tried by a criminal tribunal (e.g. the Bosnia v. Serbia case on the Srebrenica genocide).

Source: Marc Galvin, Wikipedia, ChapGPT, CoPilot, UN.

Info Box

BOX | The Obligation to Act in the Face of Genocide

The 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention imposes a legal obligation on all signatory states to prevent and punish genocide. This obligation is known as erga omnes, which means that it is owed to the entire international community and not only to the state where the crime is taking place. Thus, even a country not directly involved must intervene to the extent of its capabilities, in particular through diplomatic, economic, legal or humanitarian means. In concrete terms, this may take the form of economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, suspension of arms sales, humanitarian aid, cooperation with the courts, or speaking out at the UN.

This obligation applies to all States Parties (153 today), regardless of their geography or political interests. It does not depend on the filing of a complaint with the International Court of Justice (ICJ): the complaint is simply one legal mechanism among others, but the obligation to act exists outside of any proceedings.

Finally, it is an obligation of means, not of results: powerful States must do more, while less influential States may limit themselves to actions proportionate to their capabilities.

NB. A State may only intervene militarily to stop genocide if it has authorisation from the Security Council or a recognised collective mandate. No State may invoke genocide to justify a military attack on its own. For example, Russia attempted to justify its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by invoking the prevention of genocide, but the ICJ rejected this argument.

Source: Marc Galvin, Wikipedia, ChapGPT, CoPilot, UN.

Info Box

BOX | Is the Holodomor Recognised as Genocide?

The legal status of the Holodomor as genocide remains a matter of international debate. According to the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention, genocide refers to acts committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”

Scholars and the Ukrainian state argue that the famine fits this definition, citing Soviet policies that intentionally targeted the Ukrainian peasantry, culture, and political autonomy. Evidence includes:

  • Forced grain requisitions far beyond subsistence levels
  • Border closures preventing peasants from fleeing famine zones
  • Suppression of Ukrainian language, institutions, and elites
  • A disproportionate death toll among Ukrainians compared to other Soviet republics

As of 2025, more than 30 countries — including Canada, Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states, and recently Germany — officially recognise the Holodomor as a genocide. However, neither the United Nations nor the International Criminal Court has issued a binding legal ruling, and Russia maintains that the famine was a broader Soviet tragedy, not a targeted ethnic crime.

Source: Marc Galvin, Wikipedia, ChapGPT, CoPilot, UN.

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