Economic and Social Development in the Global South since 1950: A Mixed Record

To briefly address such a vast topic as the record of economic and social development in the Global South over the past 75 years, the familiar image of a glass that is half full and half empty may be useful.

Different starting points and very diverse situations

Before turning to the two sides of the issue, it should first be noted that not all countries in what we long referred to as the “Third World” embarked on this development process at the same time. Most Latin American countries gained independence in the 19th century, and the largest among them were already established economic powers at the beginning of the 20th century. The situation is very different for most Asian countries, which — with the exception of Japan — did not break free from the colonial yoke or acquire full sovereignty until the aftermath of the Second World War. In Africa, almost all countries would have to wait until the 1960s to gain independence and begin their process of development. This time lag — combined with differing precolonial and colonial histories, uneven economic potential, and the adoption of development policies that were in some cases highly effective and in others highly detrimental — accounts for the wide disparities observed today in the levels of economic and social development across the Global South. In effect, what prevails is a high degree of diversity.

In short, Asia has experienced remarkable development since 1950. Among its most striking success stories: China, on the verge of catching up with the United States and regaining, in terms of GDP, the position of leading global economic power it enjoyed until the 18th century; Japan, which remains the world’s fourth-largest economy; India, currently fifth and aspiring to third place by 2030; South Korea, devastated by an atrocious war in 1953 from which it emerged with a level of development similar to some of the poorest African countries, only to become a major industrial power in less than 50 years; Singapore, a tiny microstate that has become one of the world’s wealthiest countries in terms of GDP per capita and enjoys living standards comparable to Switzerland; and other large ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, all of which have made spectacular progress across all areas. Conversely, although Brazil and Mexico remain major economic powers, most large Latin American countries have regressed — like Argentina — or stagnated — like Colombia or Peru — in comparison to their level of development in the 1950s; only Chile is a significant exception. As for Africa, plagued by political instability, armed conflict, and the so-called resource curse, the continent has struggled to escape from underdevelopment. In 2025, 18 out of 20 of the world’s poorest countries in terms of GDP were African.

The glass half full: rising life expectancy and declining poverty

That said, taking a global view and focussing on the half-full side of the glass, development has made several major advances since the 1950s. The first — and also the most remarkable and indisputable — is the increase in average life expectancy at birth, which rose worldwide from 46 years in 1950 to more than 73 years in 2025, a gain of 27 years in three-quarters of a century. Here, the most impressive advances have once again been in Asia — especially in China, where life expectancy doubled from less than 40 years to around 80 years over the period. Yet, paradoxically, this was also the case in Chad, one of the world’s poorest countries, where life expectancy rose over the same period from around 35 years to almost 60 years. Of course, this reflects dramatic underlying improvements in healthcare — through large-scale vaccination campaigns — nutrition, and overall living conditions, in particular access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation, as well as a decline in maternal and infant mortality. Famines, which in the past were frequent and deadly, have practically disappeared — except in countries affected by prolonged conflict, such as Sudan, Somalia, or Yemen. Major progress has also been made in education, including girls’ education, in most of the Global South, even if this progress remains insufficient in many African countries and in the Arab-Muslim world and has, tragically, been reversed entirely by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The second major success of development over the last 50 years is, without question, the dramatic decline in world poverty. In 1950, it was estimated that 50% of the world’s population lived in extreme poverty; in 2025, only 700 million people – 8.5% of the world’s population – lived on less than USD 2.15 per day, the World Bank’s threshold for extreme poverty. Once again, it is Asia that accounts for this highly positive global picture; China alone has lifted 700 to 800 million people out of poverty in less than 50 years (poverty in China has fallen from 75% in 1980 to less than 1% today). The drop is a little less in India, the world’s most populous country, but extreme poverty in India has nonetheless fallen from around 80% at independence in 1948 to some 10-15% today. Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country, is no exception to this broader trend, with extreme poverty falling from more than 60% in 1970 to less than 10% today. Unfortunately, the scorecard is a little more mixed in Latin America, where poverty remains higher; in Brazil, for example, 28% of the population still lived in poverty in 2023. And in many African countries, the situation is even more critical, where poverty has stagnated and sometimes even increased; for example, in Nigeria, the continent’s most populous country, poverty has risen from 43% in 1985 to more than 60% today.

The glass half empty: surging inequality and environmental degradation

The most negative aspect of 75 years of economic and social development is the surge in income and wealth inequality — and social inequality in general — around the world, including in almost all countries of the Global South. Indeed, income inequality between countries has declined significantly due to rising GDP per capita in emerging economies, primarily in Asia, and to its stagnation or even decline in many advanced, industrialised countries. However, inequality has exploded within each country. Almost everywhere, this is reflected in the concentration of wealth in the hands of a tiny minority, and in a deepening urban-rural divide. Today, the richest 10% of the world’s population are estimated to receive more than half of global income and to own nearly three quarters of global wealth. Countries in the Global South are no exception. In a country like China, the Gini coefficient — a measure of income inequality — was below 0.3 until the beginning of the 1990s but is now moving dangerously close to 0.4, considered the threshold at which inequality becomes an issue. In India, the richest 10% account for 55% of total income, a figure that has doubled in 25 years and is accompanied by a spectacular rise in the number of billionaires; in early 2026, India had 300 billionaires, still far behind the United States, with nearly 1,000 billionaires, itself now overtaken by China with 1,100. Topping the global rankings for income inequality is South Africa, where the Gini coefficient is over 0.6, followed by most of its Southern African neighbours, including Namibia, Botswana, and Zambia, and by Latin American countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Panama, where the coefficient is over 0.5. Social inequalities are a ticking time bomb for political stability and, ultimately, economic development.Social inequalities are a ticking time bomb for political stability and, ultimately, economic development. 

The second dark spot in the record concerns environmental issues. Indeed, economic and social development in the countries of the Global South has generally come at the expense of nature. Within the profit-driven logic of a headlong rush to neoliberal globalisation, development has been characterised by the relentless exploitation of natural resources in regions where they are highly abundant. Perhaps the most spectacular example of this pillage is the devastation of the world’s three largest areas of tropical forest — the Amazon, Indonesia, and the Congo basin — to cultivate cash crops like soybean and palm oil, alongside the exploitation of mineral resources to satisfy the world economy’s insatiable demand for oil and natural gas — not to mention nickel, lithium, and rare earths to power the new electric and IT revolution. All of this has only accelerated climate change in the Anthropocene era, and the emergence of the concept of sustainable development in the late 1980s has done little to reverse the trend. The generalised rollback of the already modest measures adopted at the 2015 Paris Conference to limit the most catastrophic effects of climate change is driving the planet towards the abyss, regardless of latitude or longitude. The world’s poorest countries will nonetheless be its primary and most immediate victims, which will only intensify mass migration to the wealthier North and heighten global instability.

In conclusion, an even bleaker future ahead

“Mixed” then seems the most fitting term to describe the record of economic and social development in the Global South over the past 75 years.  “Mixed” then seems the most fitting term to describe the record of economic and social development in the Global South over the past 75 years. Unfortunately, however, it may well be that the future is bleaker still. In this regard, recent shifts in the global political and geostrategic situation have been devastating. The international system set up after the Second World War is crumbling; we are witnessing the emasculation of governmental institutions and NGOs created to uphold peace, the rule of law, conflict resolution, the protection of fundamental freedoms and, indeed — through cooperation and solidarity — to promote more equitable economic and social development for all of humanity. This catastrophic regression reflects a resurgence of predatory mercantilism, the return of an aggressive, destructive imperialism, the rule of brute force, and the unlimited appetite for profit of a tiny, narcissistic, and unscrupulous techno-financial oligarchy with authoritarian if not quasi-fascist tendencies. If our societies fail to reverse this trajectory, there is every reason to fear that the record of economic and social development in the Global South over the next 75 years — taking us to the end of the 21st century — will be far worse than merely “mixed”.